Patients\u27 Rights in Managed Care - Exit, Voice, and Choice by Annas, George J.
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
1997 
Patients' Rights in Managed Care - Exit, Voice, and Choice 
George J. Annas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
210 ? July 17, 1997
The New England Journal  of  Medicine
Legal Issues in Medicine
PATIENTS’ RIGHTS IN MANAGED CARE 
— EXIT, VOICE, AND CHOICE
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
HE ability of consumers to complain effec-
tively about services and products is a key in-
gredient of the market. In Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty,1 economist Albert O. Hirschman argues
that the ability to take one’s business elsewhere may
not be enough to empower consumers in markets
where all providers act similarly. Instead of simply
going elsewhere, consumers need to have an effec-
tive way to voice their complaints, in order to give
providers an incentive to be more responsive to con-
sumers’ interests.1 Marc Rodwin has suggested that
the Hirschman analysis may be particularly relevant
to members of managed-care organizations and “in-
dividuals with on-going relations with providers such
as nursing homes.”2
Providing patients, who depend on their physi-
cians for expert advice, with an effective voice is a
long-standing problem that has been highlighted,
but not caused, by managed care.2 The backlash
against managed care, however, provides an oppor-
tunity to develop meaningful options for patients.3
In this regard, the questions of dispute resolution,
grievance mechanisms, and appeals procedures have
recently taken on urgency in the courtroom, as well
as in proposals for legislative reform at the state and
federal levels. Here I examine the decisions of U.S.
District Court Judge Alfredo C. Marquez in Grijal-
va v. Shalala,4 a class-action suit on behalf of the
Medicare members of a health maintenance organi-
zation (HMO), which sought to compel the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
adopt more user-friendly rules for appeals. The class-
action suit was brought by the Center for Medicare
Advocacy and other public-interest groups on behalf
of patients like Gregoria Grijalva, an elderly amputee
with an indwelling catheter, who had been told by
the HMO that she was not eligible to receive home
health care.
MEDICARE HMOS
All health insurers have problems with dispute res-
olution. Managed-care organizations are nonethe-
less under special scrutiny, because denial of treat-
ment is more common, physicians may be restricted
in their role as advocates for their patients, and pa-
tients may have little opportunity to leave the plan
(“exit”). Federal law requires that HMOs enrolling
T
Medicare patients provide them with the same range
of services provided to Medicare patients not en-
rolled in HMOs.5,6 The law also requires that HMOs
provide “meaningful procedures for hearing and re-
solving grievances” between the HMO and its Medi-
care members.5 Dissatisfied enrollees have a right to
a hearing before an administrative-law judge, if the
dispute involves $100 or more, or a judicial review,
if the amount exceeds $1,000.6 HMOs must have
procedures for appealing the denial of payment for
emergency treatment, the denial of payment for
services rendered by a non-HMO provider, and the
refusal to provide services.6 The essence of the com-
plaint in Grijalva was that HMOs were not follow-
ing these appeals requirements and that HHS was
not enforcing them, thus violating both the statuto-
ry and the constitutional due-process rights of Medi-
care recipients.4
HHS argued that it was doing all it was statutorily
required to do by urging its private contractors to
adopt continuous-quality-improvement procedures
and that the HMOs involved were “merely private
providers who contract with the government to pro-
vide medical care to Medicare beneficiaries.”4 HHS
further argued that the government was not respon-
sible for wrongful acts by private HMO contractors,
so the Constitution did not apply. This argument
was based almost exclusively on a 1982 Supreme
Court case, Blum v. Yaretsky,7 in which the Court de-
cided that a nursing home’s decision to transfer its
Medicare and Medicaid patients to another facility
was a private act. The transfer was necessitated by the
government’s decision to decertify the nursing home
for Medicaid and Medicare patients. The Court con-
cluded that since the transfer itself involved no action
on the part of the government, the residents had no
right, under the due-process clause of the Constitu-
tion, to a hearing before the transfer.7
Judge Marquez, however, found that Blum was
not determinative in the Grijalva case, because
HHS “had delegated the entire responsibility for its
mandated . . . health care duties” to the HMOs.4
He cited a case involving certified home-health-care
agencies, which are private entities, in which the
court concluded, “It is patently unreasonable to pre-
sume that Congress would permit a state to disclaim
federal responsibilities by contracting away its obli-
gations to a private entity.”4,8 Criteria that courts
have used to find private health care entities subject
to constitutional due-process standards include gov-
ernment payment for services, government regula-
tion of HMO activities as they apply to Medicare re-
cipients, HHS regulations and directives to HMOs,
the creation by HHS of a legal framework governing
HMO activities, and the right of Medicare benefici-
aries in HMOs to appeal directly to the secretary of
HHS in the case of a denial of services.4,8 Applying
these factors, Judge Marquez found sufficient evi-
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dence of government action to invoke the constitu-
tional rights of due process. The next step was for
the judge to determine the due-process rights of the
plaintiffs in Grijalva — that is, the dispute-resolu-
tion process required by the Constitution.
MANAGED-CARE DISPUTES
There are major distinctions between indemnity, or
fee-for-service, insurance plans and risk-bearing man-
aged-care plans when it comes to disputes over bene-
fit determinations. With fee-for-service insurance, the
medical services have typically already been rendered,
and the only remaining issue is payment. In addition,
the physician can usually be expected to act as the pa-
tient’s advocate with regard to retrospective denial of
payment.4 In managed-care plans, however, disputes
often occur before the medical services have been
rendered, and the physician often acts as the gate-
keeper who decides that a specific medical service
sought by the patient is not needed. Physicians in
managed-care plans may also have a financial incen-
tive not to advocate for the patient, although there
is no uniform way in which physicians are paid.4 
Most important, taking one’s business elsewhere is
an almost cost-free option for patients with indem-
nity insurance, who can usually simply go to another
physician for the care they want and have it paid for.
But this is not a realistic option for most members
of managed-care organizations, because employers
may limit their employees’ choice of plans, employ-
ees may not be able to afford a more expensive plan
or to pay out of pocket, and the opportunity to
change plans is usually limited to one brief period a
year, which is often not the time when medical care
is sought. These generic problems, however, primar-
ily involve people under the age of 65 years. In
Medicare, exit is freely available, and in a recent two-
year period, one out of three Medicare patients in
managed care returned to indemnity insurance.5 So
the ability to voice complaints is even more impor-
tant for non-Medicare patients, who may not realis-
tically have the choice of exiting the plan, than for
Medicare patients in managed-care organizations.
HHS argued that in 1993 and 1994 the rates of
appeals for denials of service by fee-for-service insur-
ers were 27 and 31 times as high, respectively, as
those for denials by HMOs.4 HHS contended that
the much lower rates of appeals for HMOs were ev-
idence of the good job they were doing. The judge,
however, concluded that a more likely explanation
for this wide discrepancy was the failure of HMOs
to provide a meaningful appeals process.4 The judge
noted, for example, that a review of 570 denial no-
tices to HMO members disclosed three problems.
First, 52 percent of the notices were illegible, pri-
marily because most were printed in type that was
smaller than 12 points, the recognized minimal print
size for readability by elderly persons. Second, 74
percent of the notices provided vague or ambiguous
reasons for denial of services. Third, only 41 percent
of the notices contained an explanation of personal
liability resulting from care incurred subsequent to
the denial.4
Judge Marquez also found that the notices tended
to “hide the ball” by obscuring the eligibility re-
quirements, thus making it very difficult for a claim-
ant to “fathom what additional evidence to present
to rebut the denial.”4 He was also concerned about
the general lack of an opportunity to present one’s
appeal in a face-to-face setting such as an informal
hearing and noted, “Due process requires a mean-
ingful opportunity to present one’s case at a mean-
ingful time.”4 He further observed that denial of
treatment can result in “unnecessary pain and suffer-
ing or death,”4 and thus the ability to appeal an ad-
verse decision quickly is essential to due process in
these circumstances.
Exactly what process is due a person under the
Constitution depends on a balancing test that in-
cludes an examination of “the private interest at
stake; the risk of an erroneous deprivation; the prob-
able value of additional procedural safeguards; and
the fiscal and administrative burdens” that the addi-
tional safeguards would require.4 The Supreme Court
has ruled, for example, that an evidentiary hearing is
required before welfare benefits are terminated9 but
not when disability benefits are denied.10 In the wel-
fare case, which Judge Marquez found to be most
like the denial of medical treatment, the court had
noted that “termination of aid pending resolution of
a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits.”9 Similarly, of course, denial of a needed treat-
ment could lead to death or severe suffering. Welfare
recipients have a due-process right to the following
when benefits are to be terminated: timely and ade-
quate notice of the reasons for termination; an effec-
tive opportunity to appeal the termination by con-
fronting adverse witnesses and presenting evidence
orally; legal counsel, if desired; an impartial decision
maker; a decision based on law and evidence pre-
sented at the hearing; and a statement of reasons for
the decision.9
Applying these constitutional due-process guide-
lines, Judge Marquez concluded that HHS had vio-
lated federal law by continuing to contract with an
HMO that failed to meet the following constitutional
requirements with respect to notice and hearings:
Notice: 1. Shall always be given for any and all denials of
service;
2. Shall be timely;
3. Shall be readable: at least 12-point type;
4. Shall state the reasons for denial clearly and in
such terms as to enable the enrollee to argue
his or her case;
5. Shall inform the enrollee of all appeal rights,
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including PRO [peer-review-organization] re-
view;
6. Shall  inform the enrollee of  the right to a
hearing on reconsideration and that addition-
al evidence may be presented, in person, and
shall explain the procedure for securing an in-
formal hearing; and
7. Shall provide instruction on how to obtain
supporting evidence, including medical rec-
ords and supporting affidavits from the at-
tending physician. The HMO must abolish
any policy or procedure which would impede
such advocacy.4
Hearing: 1. Shall be informal, in-person communication
with the decisionmaker;
2. Shall be available upon request for all service
denials; and
3. Shall be timely according to the seriousness
of the medical condition implicated by the
denied service: Immediate hearing shall be
available for acute care service denials, specif-
ically where delivery of the service is prevent-
ed by the denial. . . . All other hearings can
be within the normal course of the HMO’s
60-day time frame for reconsideration.4
AFTERMATH OF THE GRIJALVA DECISION
The Grijalva criteria apply only to the approxi-
mately 5 million Medicare patients in HMOs. But
problems with dispute resolution must be addressed
throughout the health care industry. Fair procedures
for the resolution of disputes are critical, because
decisions that are not subject to review by impartial
decision makers are themselves unlikely to be made
fairly when there are financial incentives not to pro-
vide treatment. Of course, persons “often lack the
resources, the stamina, or the inclination” to use
grievance processes, even when such procedures are
available,2 and many people fear that a complaint
could result in retaliation, especially “in managed
care because consumers are locked into a formidable
organization.”2 Effective dispute-resolution mecha-
nisms must be easier to use and less threatening than
existing mechanisms. Facilitating appeals (“voice”
and “choice”) in the form of fair dispute-resolution
mechanisms should help improve both access to
services and the quality of care.
In late 1996, the American Association of Health
Plans, which represents more than 1000 managed-
care plans, pledged to streamline appeals processes
and make them more “patient-friendly.”11 The asso-
ciation said that its member plans “recognize that
accessible, fair, and timely grievance and appeals pro-
cedures must be in place and understood by both
enrollees and all providers and health plan person-
nel.”11 The group repeated its pledge in early 1997.12 
HHS announced that it would adopt new regula-
tions to bring it into compliance with the decision.13
Nonetheless, Judge Marquez issued an additional
ruling in March 1997,14 in which he ordered Medi-
care HMOs to provide written notice of a benefit
denial “no more than five working days after written
or oral request for a service or referral” or “at least
one working day before reduction or termination of
a course of treatment.”14 He also ordered that the
notice be “clear, readable” and “in at least 12-point
type” and that it include “an explanation in lay lan-
guage of the coverage rule” on which the decision is
based, an explanation of appeals available, a descrip-
tion of additional evidence that would support the
enrollee’s position and how it could be submitted,
and procedures for securing an informal hearing be-
fore the decision maker for reconsideration.14 HHS
was required to provide enrollees with an expedited
reconsideration within 3 working days, including in-
person communication with the decision maker in
cases in which “services are urgently needed,” with
the review itself completed within an additional 10
working days.14 Urgency can be established on the
basis of a physician’s written explanation, and plan
doctors shall “be free to give supporting documen-
tation without fear of retaliation or reprisal from the
HMO.”14
On April 30, HHS published its final rules for an
expedited review process for Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in HMOs,15 effective as of June 30, with
compliance expected by August 28.15 In an apparent
attempt to camouflage its courtroom defeat, the de-
partment barely mentions Judge Marquez’s opinion.
Instead, HHS says it was guided primarily by a mod-
el grievance act prepared by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners. The rules require
an expedited review process for any denial of service
that could “jeopardize the life or health of the en-
rollee or the enrollee’s ability to regain maximum
function.” The expedited review process must in-
clude acceptance of an oral request for a review,
prompt notice as to whether the review will be ex-
pedited, notification of the decision within 72 hours
after the request, and acceptance of a physician’s
request for an expedited review, regardless of wheth-
er the physician is affiliated with the organization.
Should the request be denied, the enrollee also has
the right to a reconsideration of the decision, in-
cluding an expedited reconsideration under essen-
tially the same procedures and with the same time
frame as the initial review.15 Perhaps the most note-
worthy provisions of these new rules are the notifi-
cation of the decision within 72 hours (HMO rep-
resentatives argued for five working days) and the
mandatory expedited review when requested by a
physician.
Consumer groups have criticized the rules, noting
especially that they give the health plan the discre-
tion to determine whether the beneficiary should re-
ceive an expedited review (if not requested by a phy-
sician) and do not require in-person communication
with the patient for initial reconsiderations. Within
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days of publishing its new rules, HHS announced it
would appeal Judge Marquez’s March order.
Legislation mandating specific dispute-resolution
mechanisms and appeals processes is also pending
before the Congress and in many state legislatures.
The issue is complex, but Judge Marquez has pro-
vided a very useful set of guidelines on which to base
legislation that applies to all patients in all insurance
plans.
FACILITATING CHOICE
As Judge Marquez understood, the role of the
physician in the resolution of disputes over medical
care is central. HMO managers often declare at na-
tional conferences that the physician can no longer
be an advocate for the patient. The exact meaning
of this statement is unclear, but it seems to imply
that the traditional doctor–patient relationship is no
longer financially feasible. Decisions about what is
best for the patient are made in the context of that
relationship, through a process of informed consent
in which all reasonable medical alternatives are dis-
cussed, with the physician acting as the patient’s ad-
vocate to ensure that the patient obtains the agreed-
on treatment. Of course, one may well agree with
HMO managers that just such a system, driven by
fee-for-service plans, led to overutilization, unneces-
sary care, and financial ruin. The new model requires
physicians to advocate for a group of patients (i.e.,
the members of the managed-care organization) and
take the allocation of resources within the group
into account in presenting medical alternatives to
their patients. In such a model, patients may be left
alone to advocate for themselves if they believe they
need a medical treatment that is either not men-
tioned by the physician or not covered by the plan.
As an insurer, the managed-care organization (like
all insurers) has a financial incentive to encourage
patients needing expensive medical treatments to
leave the plan in order to obtain treatment and has
no financial incentive to provide patients with an ef-
fective way to voice their objections to denial of
treatment through a user-friendly process of dispute
resolution. 
All insurers have a financial incentive to discourage
appeals, since the appeals process itself costs money,
and a decision in favor of the patient will cost even
more. Discouraging appeals may encourage patients
to seek desired or needed care elsewhere and to pay
for it themselves. Of course, patients must know
about alternative treatments in order to seek them
and must know about any financial incentives their
physicians might have not to recommend alternative
treatments or not to refer them to specialists or for
diagnostic testing. Recognizing these problems, a
circuit court of appeals has ruled in another case
(Shea v. Eisenstein) that managed-care organizations
must disclose physicians’ financial incentives to pa-
tients so that they can make informed decisions
about whether or not to accept their physicians’ ad-
vice.16 In this case, a primary care physician allegedly
advised Patrick Shea, a 40-year-old man who was ex-
periencing shortness of breath, muscle tingling, and
dizziness and had an extensive family history of heart
disease, that referral to a cardiologist was unneces-
sary because the patient was too young to have heart
disease.16 The primary care physicians associated with
the HMO, Medica Health Plans, operated by the
Minneapolis-based Allied Health System, “were re-
warded for not making covered referrals to special-
ists [by bonuses] and were docked a portion of their
fees if they made too many.”16 The patient accepted
the advice and soon thereafter died of a heart attack.
His widow filed a wrongful-death action against the
health plan, arguing that had her husband known
about the way his physician was paid by the man-
aged-care organization, he would have sought a sec-
ond opinion from a heart specialist and paid for the
consultation himself.16 
This case and the HHS rules highlight the tension
in the doctor–patient relationship created by capita-
tion and the limits of even the best-designed dis-
pute-resolution mechanism to address this tension.
A user-friendly appeals mechanism that protects the
physician from retaliation by the HMO can help
the patient obtain a recommended treatment. But
if the physician does not recommend a treatment or
even suggest it as a reasonable option, the patient
may not have sufficient knowledge to realize that a
decision not to offer a treatment has been made.
The possibility of appealing the decision may never
enter the patient’s mind. Of course, one could pro-
vide the equivalent of a warning label for all doctor–
patient conversations, stating that the physician is
being paid to minimize referrals and treatments, but
this would simply serve to erode the patients’ trust
in their physicians. Although user-friendly appeals
mechanisms are helpful, they cannot address the fun-
damental issue of trust in the doctor–patient relation-
ship. And to the extent that managed-care organiza-
tions are undermining this trust by recasting the
doctor–patient relationship, confronting the prob-
lem will require much more than simply providing
more accessible dispute-resolution mechanisms.
A Wall Street Journal health columnist advises her
affluent readers that if they are convinced they need
a specialist and their plan balks, they should go to
the specialist anyway, pay out of pocket, and “fight
later about who [ultimately] pays.”17 But such re-
sponses put all the burden on patients and none on
the managed-care organization and its physicians.
This is unfair. Managed-care organizations and their
physicians are certainly not incapable of error in
making decisions about coverage. As Eleanor Kin-
ney, an administrative-law expert, properly empha-
sizes, “It should never be forgotten that procedures
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are an important mechanism to confer power and
adjust the balance of power among the parties to the
process.”5 How should such a system be designed?
DISPUTE-RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Mechanisms for resolving disputes about medical
care should be quick, easy to use, and fair. In the
case of prospectively denied services, patients should
be able to obtain a second medical opinion within
hours, and in the case of a denial of services that is
based on contractual language, they should be able
to appeal to an internal neutral decision maker with-
in two days. It also seems reasonable for states to re-
quire that all health insurers in their jurisdictions
have dispute-resolution procedures that not only meet
the Grijalva requirements but go even further.
All patients, not just Medicare patients in HMOs,
should have legally established grievance and ap-
peals rights. Although some variation seems reason-
able, the basic provisions, including those governing
notification, review by a neutral decision maker, a
timely response, and a written explanation of the
reasons for the decision, should be uniform. In ad-
dition, the state should provide patients who have
been turned down by the health plan and their phy-
sicians with a neutral and fair appeals process (sep-
arate from the judicial system), such as independent
arbitration by a knowledgeable panel, which can
quickly review and reverse or uphold an adverse de-
cision. The hearing officers for these appeals could
be members of the state health department. Deci-
sions by independent arbitration panels should be
binding on the health insurer, but because of the
imbalance of power, patients should be able to ap-
peal these decisions. In cases requiring treatment
within days or weeks, the internal appeals process
should take less than 48 hours, and the external ap-
peals process no more than another 48 hours. In the
case of an HMO’s decision to discontinue ongoing
treatment, whether inpatient or outpatient, treat-
ment should be continued during the expedited ap-
peals process.
Records of all internal and external appeals should
be publicly available (although the names and iden-
tifying characteristics of patients can be withheld to
protect their privacy) for the purpose of comparison
and improvement in the quality of care. All costs of
nonjudicial appeals should be borne by the insurer.
Patients should always have the option to challenge
decisions in court, but once a dispute is taken to
court, both parties have already lost in terms of
time, money, and efficiency in decision making. The
closer to the bedside the dispute can be resolved, in
terms of both time and distance, the better.18 No
health care plan that is delivering high-quality med-
ical care should have anything to fear from a speedy
dispute-resolution process that treats patients fairly.
The primary problem with existing grievance mech-
anisms is that they are slow and one-sided. A survey
of 196 Kaiser Permanente arbitrations in northern
California, completed between 1984 and 1988 and
recently made public, found that the final resolu-
tion of disputes took an average of more than 28
months.19 If physicians cannot or will not act as
their patients’ advocates, some other party will have
to assume this role for patients who wish to chal-
lenge denials of benefits quickly and effectively. It
seems unlikely that a patient would be satisfied with
an advocate hired by the health plan, and in any
event, it is unlikely that such a person could act in-
dependently on the patient’s behalf. If the system is
to succeed in resolving disputes quickly, patients
must believe that it is fair. Thus, advocates will have
to be provided by an independent organization,
such as the state consumer-protection agency or the
state attorney general’s office.20 Of course, independ-
ent consumer groups could also make advocates
available for patients. To be feasible, an advocacy
program would require predictable funding. An in-
crease in licensing fees paid by all entities doing
business as health-insurance or claims-management
companies seems a reasonable source of funding.
Such funding should avoid preemption under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, because
it does not tax group health insurance benefits or
premiums.21 
Relying solely on the ability of patients to leave
one health plan and move to another is not suffi-
cient to ensure either the rights of patients in man-
aged-care plans or improvement in the quality of
care. Improving opportunities for enrollees to voice
their objections can both enhance patients’ rights
and highlight areas of potential concern with respect
to quality. In the past two years, most of the man-
aged-care backlash has been played out in Congress
and the state legislatures. Courts are slower to react
but will intervene, especially in cases involving serv-
ices to Medicare recipients and alleged violations of
due process. Prevention is almost always preferable
to cure, and the states and the federal government
should act to ensure that all patients have access to
dispute-resolution mechanisms that are quick, easy
to use, and fair, as well as to advocates who can help
them use these mechanisms. Supplementing the
ability to exit with the ability to have an effective
voice can foster choice and enhance patients’ rights.
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